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ORAL GIFT AS A DEFENSE IN AN ACTION OF EJECTMENT
UNDER THE CODE
A recent Minnesota case,' following a doctrine enunciated in
previous decisions in that state 2 represents an interesting develop-
ment in procedure under the code accompanied by a change in
substantive law. The plaintiff placed his son in possession of a
farm in 1911, and promised to give him the land later by deed
or by will; the evidence is conflicting as to the exact nature of
the promise, if any. The son married in 1913, remained in pos-
session of the land, cultivated the soil, built a house, and made
other substantial improvements in reliance upon the gift. He
died in 1915 and the plaintiff brought an action of ejectment
'Lindell v. Lindell (1917) 16o N. W. (Minn.) 1O31.
'The doctrine is fully set out in Hayes v. Hayes (1914) 126 Minn. 389.
A dictum is found in Trebesch v. Trebesch (1915) 13o Minn. 368.
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against the widow. The defendant, the widow in possession,
pleaded in defense that she had title to the land in question by
virtue of the oral gift, now completely executed. The jury
found that there was an oral gift, accompanied by a promise to
convey the land by deed or will. The court thereupon held that
the defendant had presented a good defense, and that the action
of ejectment could not be maintained.
We must first consider the nature of the problem involved in
the case. Ordinarily, when a donee of an oral gift has gone
into possession of the land and made substantial improvements
3
in reliance upon the gift, the problem has been considered pri-
marily one under the Statute of Frauds.' It has become well
established through a long line of decisions in England and
America that the taking of possession of the land by the donee,
followed by a sufficient change of position, as manifested by the
making of substantial improvements, constitutes such part per-
formance as to take the case out of the Statute of Frauds.
5
In this discussion we shall deal with the more substantial and
difficult problem involved in these cases; namely, the character
of the interest or ownership acquired by the donee. Is this
interest purely equitable or legal? May the donee enforce it only
by an equitable action for specific performance, or-what
amounts to the same thing-by equitable counterclaim for specific
performance, under code procedure; or, on the other hand,
may he set it up in the legal action as a so-called "equitable"
defense, i. e., merely as a defense and not by way of counter-
claim asking relief ?6
'As to what constitutes substantial improvements see Fry, Specific Per-
formance, pp. 256-259; Maddison v. Alderson (1883) L. IL 8 App. Cas.
467.
' That the problem is not dominantly one under the Statute of Frauds
becomes clear when we alter the facts by the substitution of a writing for
the oral statement, on the strength of which the donee goes into pos-
session.
A few of the many cases in which specific performance by the donee
was allowed are: Lobdell v. Lobdell (1867) 36 N. Y. 327; Rowe v. Hen-
derson (903) 4 Ind. T. 597; Wilson v. Kruse (1915) 27o Ill. 298; Peters
v. Jones (1872) 49 Ia. 512; Christensen v. Christensen (914) 265 II.
x7O. See Fry, Specific Performance, pp. 256-259; Steevens Hospital v.
Dyas (1864) 15 Ir. Ch. 405.
' Equity seems to have developed the doctrine that a gratuitous prom-
ise by the donor becomes enforcible in equity because substantial
improvements have been made in reliance upon it. Freeman v. Freeman
44
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At common law, a defendant could not set up an equitable
title as a defense to a legal action such as ejectment7 The
holder of the equitable title was compelled to resort to a court
of equity to commence another suit and to enjoin the first pro-
ceeding. Under the reformed procedure in England8 and
America, equitable defenses by way of counterclaim are now
allowed in legal actions.9 The code states, under the reformed
procedure, have attempted to combine the elements of the old
and the new procedure; equitable defenses are permitted in the
same action by way of counterclaim or cross-demand.1 0 The
defendant, owner of an equitable title, is permitted in the same
suit to turn his equitable interest into a legal estate and then
interpose a legal defense to the action of ejectment.1 The
defense is to be viewed in the identical manner in regard to sub-
stance as if the same facts had been made the basis of a petition
(187o) 43 N. Y. 234; Seavey v. Drake (1882) 62 N. H. 393. When
courts say the improvements are consideration for the promise, they are
using consideration in a sense different from that ordinarily used by
courts of law. Cf. expressions in the principal case: "The promise togive is no longer nudum pactum. It has become a promise upon a con-
sideration, not a consideration moving to the promisor, but, nevertheless,
one moving from the promisee."
'See Bliss, Code Pleading, see. 347; Adams, Ejectment, p. 242; A. & E.Encyc. of Law, Vol. X, p. 533. The common-law procedure in this respect
is still largely fol!owed in Illinois. Fleming v. Carter (1873) 70 Ill.286. In the federal courts the common-law rule was adhered to until
recently. The principle of equitable estoppel was largely resorted to.
Kirk v. Hamilton (i88o) 1o2 U. S. 68; Killian v. Ebinghaus (1884) ilo
U. S. 568.
8 Since the Judicature Act of 1873.
'An equitable defense by way of counterclaim must be distinguishedfrom the so-called equitable defense which is strictly based on equitable
principles. The existence of a mere equitable interest has generally been
considered as a power in the donee to invest himself with a good legaldefense by counterclaim or cross-bill. Thus (i) a vendee or lessee inpossession under a written contract, who has performed the terms of
the agreement, has a good legal defense to an action of ejectment; (2)
a vendee in possession under an oral agreement has only an equitable
interest with no right to remain in possession unless he exercises hispower to perfect his equitable interest into a legal estate; (3) a donee
who has entered into possession and made improvements under a written
or oral gift has an equitable interest with a corresponding power to
acquire a legal defense.
"See Tyler, Ejectment, p. 69.
"Missouri has adhered to this procedure in a long series of cases; it
would seem that affirmative equitable relief could never be granted to
the defendant upon his mere answer. Gott v. Powell (1867) 41 Mo. 416;
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to chancery for equitable relief. The requirements under the
code procedure, as adopted by the great majority of the code
states, are well illustrated by the case of Zeuske v. Zeuske.
12
Under a set of facts very similar to those of the principal case,
it was held that under the Oregon code,1 3 the defendant in an
action of ejectment could defend his possession under an equit-
able title by means of a cross-bill only and not by answer.14
Until a comparatively recent date Minnesota decisions have gen-
erally adhered to the principle that the holder of an equitable
interest in real estate must seek affirmative relief in defending
an action of ejectment.1 5
Minnesota has by its recent decision adopted a radical simpli-
fication. Under its present procedure an oral grantee, or oral
donee who has gone into possession and materially altered his
situation, is apparently regarded as having a so-called "equitable"
defense to an action of ejectment by the owner of the legal title.1 6
The defendant, in case of an oral gift, is, in effect, regarded as
vested with legal ownership and with what is actually a legal
Harris v. Vinyard (i868) 42 Mo. 568; State v. Meagher (I869) 44 Mo.
356; Anderson v. Scott (1888) 94 Mo. 637.
The following states are substantially in accord with this doctrine:
Wisconsin, Indiana, California, Iowa, Georgia and Oregon. See Hammer
v. Hammer (1875) 39 Wis. x82; Groves v. Marks (I869) 32 Ind. 319;
Hartley v. Brown (1873) 46 Cal. 2O1; Walker v. Kynett (1871) 32 Ia.
524; Grace v. Means (19o7) 129 Ga. 638; South Portland Land Co. v.
Munger (I9oo) 36 Or. 457.
The cases in New York and Nebraska do not adhere to a single policy
and are somewhat confusing. For these cases, see note 24, infra.
(i9o9) 55 Or. 65. See note in i912A Ann. Cas.
B & C. Comp. secs. 391, 392.
" cross-bill has long been recognized by the Oregon courts as an
appropriate remedy by which an equitable interest may be made available
as a defense. See Hatcher v. Briggs (1876) 6 Or. 3x; South Portland
Land Co. v. Munger, supra.
"Freeman v. Brewster (1897) 7o Minn. 203: "The rule which has
prevailed in this jurisdiction since i86o is that the holder of an equitable
title to real property in an action to determine the right of possession
must allege his equities in his pleadings so fully and completely that a
court of equity would under the old practice have granted him adequate
relief, and awarded him possession or confirmed his right of possession
against the holder of the adverse legal title." See also Williams v. Murphy
(875) 21 Minn. 534; Merrill v. Dearing (i891) 47 Minn. 137; Jorgensen
v. Jorgensen (1goo) 81 Minn. 428. See ejectment under the Minnesota
practice in Tyler, Ejectment, pp. 721-727.
" Hayes v. Hayes (1914) 126 Minn. 389, seems to be the earliest case to
have announced the new procedure. In Trebesch v. Trebesch (915) 130
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defense. The case of Hayes v. Hayes,7 which seems to have
originated the new doctrine, contains this significant passage:
"It is claimed that it was erior to admit any testimony
as to an executed parol gift because the question was not
raised by the pleadings. The answer pleaded that Mat-
thew Hayes was at the time of his death lawfully seized of
the premises and that he had good. and sufficient title
thereto. We hold the pleading sufficient to permit the
defense of title by parol gift accepted and executed. We
also hold that this was a defense that could be made and
litigated in this action of ejectment, though it is a claim
that is usually litigated in an action for specific perform-
ance." 8
As in the principal case, the entire matter was left to the jury,
to determine whether there had been a present executed gift.19
Under the Minnesota procedure it is no longer imperative to ask
for affirmative relief 20 ; it has become entirely unnecessary and
superfluous.
A principle very largely in harmony with the Minnesota pro-
cedure has been advocated by Pomeroy.21 While the contention
of Pomeroy is not altogether clear, he appears to urge that the
owner of an equitable title in the land should be permitted to
interpose his equitable interest as a defense in an action to regain
the possession: the distinction between defenses made available
through affirmative action and that interposed by way of answer
he considers as unimportant. 2 Bliss 23 apparently takes issue
Minn. 368, by a dictum, the difficulty of the Minnesota doctrine is revealed
in a case, where the plaintiff was induced to take a lease from the defend-
ant's guardian, of the premises he had received by oral gift, under the
belief that he had no title without documentary evidence.
(1914) 126 Minn. 389, 394.
" The italics are the writer's.
Expression used in principal case.
Required by the court in Zeuske v. Zeuske, supra.
'Remedies and Remedial Rights (3d ed.) secs. 87-io6.
'Note these characteristic passages: "A defense is not to be con-
ceived of as the means of acquiring positive relief or any remedy, legal
or equitable. If the defendant is allowed the affirmative relief of securing
a judgment then it ceases to be a defense and becomes in turn a cause of
action. . . . A defense is a negative resistance, an obstacle, a some-
thing which prevents a recovery, whether it be legal or equitable."
Pomeroy has evidently failed to recognize that a donee or oral grantee
has no actual equitable defense entitling him to possession, but only a
power to perfect his equitable interest into legal ownership.
"Bliss, Code Pleading, secs. 347-351.
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with Pomeroy on this subject. He clearly propounds the gen-
erally accepted view that unless the defendant has such an
equity in the land as to entitle him to the possession, then
his defense depends upon his ability to establish his right to a
conveyance; that must be sought by a counterclaim, as formerly
by a bill for specific performance. The defense is entirely
dependent upon his successs in prosecuting such counterclaim
or cross-bill.
24
The Minnesota doctrine represents a merger of law and equity,
whereby the donee is regarded as vested with a legal interest
sufficient to defeat an action of ejectment by the donor. The
donee or oral grantee is accorded a so-called "equitable" defense
(actually a legal defense), instead of a privilege and a power
to establish a legal defense through equitable counterclaim.25
Minnesota decisions have undoubtedly been greatly influenced
by the code procedure, in effecting so complete a blending of
legal and equitable principles. In other jurisdictions judge and
jury continue to function respectively in the field of equity and
law questions involved in these suits. The shifting of responsi-
bility from judge and jury exclusively to the jury is a widely
significant departure. 28  Not only has there been effected a con-
" Pomeroy relies to some extent upon the case of Dobson v. Pearce
(1854) 12 N. Y. 156. The case does not, however, fully support his
theory. The opinion of the court is not clear, but it appears to hold that
a Connecticut decree declaring that a New York money judgment had
been obtained by fraud, might be set up as a defense to the action at
law brought on the original money judgment; the fraud being regarded
as a defense only as established by the decree. For a full discussion of
the principles involved in this case, see Professor Walter W. Cook, Powers
of Courts of Equity (9,5) I5 COL. L. REV. 247. For cases more nearly
upholding Pomeroy, see Hoppough v. Struble (1875) 6o N. Y. 430 (dicta);
Crary v. Goodman (1855) 12 N. Y. 266. But see contrary opinion on the
same case in lower court (I851) 9 Barb. (N. Y.) 657. Cf. Dale v. Hun-
neman (1881) 12 Neb. 221.
'It is not clear whether the legal title is regarded as vesting in the
donee or grantee when possession is first taken. If held to vest retroac-
tively then Minnesota has evolved a theory whereby the donee or grantee
gets legal title through a mode of livery of seisin.
In this connection, note remarks of Pomeroy, Equity Jurisprudence
(3d ed.) sec. I16: "The reformed American procedure has attempted
to combine the two, or rather to enlarge the equity rules and doctrines,
so that they may embrace all actions, legal as well as equitable. A com-
plete amalgamation, however, is not possible as long as the jury trial is
maintained in legal actions."
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siderable alteration in procedure, but concomitantly a change in
substantive law has resulted.2 7
B.L.
RESCISSION OF A STOCK DIVIDEND ALREADY DECLARED, AND
RESULTING JURAL RELATIONS
The rule that cash dividends once declared and published are
irrevocable is well established,' but a new situation has arisen
in the recent case of Staats v. Biograph Co.2 In this case a
dividend of stock, having been declared and published, was
rescinded. The declaration and publication of a cash dividend
creates certain duties to pay a sum certain which constitutes a
debt at common law. The resolution in the instant case created
no debi, as it reserved to the directors the option of paying in
cash or paying in stock. Such an obligation is not an obligation
to pay a sum certain. Where one is bound by a covenant to do
one of two things, then, in an action by the covenantee, the
measure of damages is estimated by the loss engendered by a
failure to do that which is least detrimental. The court followed
this theory, citing Robinson v. Robinson.'
A stock dividend may properly be declared in two different
cases. First, a corporation, instead of distributing its surplus in
the form of cash dividends, may in accordance with state statutes
add to the amount of its capital, and distribute the shares repre-
senting the increase among the shareholders. The property of
the corporation is not increased or diminished by such a divi-
dend. 4  Second, a stock dividend may be declared payable in
' Compare the development that has occurred with respect to the interest
acquired by the holders of easements under oral licenses and oral agree-
ments. See note in (IgI) 25 HARv. L. REV. 191; Gilmore v. Armstrong
(1896) 48 Neb. 92; Uncanoonuck Road Co. v. Orr (1893) 67 N. H. 541;
Arbaugh v. Alexander (1911) 151 Ia. 552.
'Morawetz, Corporations, Vol. I, sec. 445: "A dividend properly
declared by the directors of a corporation cannot subsequently be revoked.
Those persons who were shareholders on the books of the company at
the time when the dividend was declared have a legal claim against the
company for the payment of the amount of the dividend." See also Tay-
lor, Corporations (5th ed.) sec. 568; Machen, Modern Law of Corpora-
tions, Vol. II, sec.- 1358; Marshall, Corporations, see. 283.
2 (1916) 236 Fed. 454.
8(1851) I DeG. M. & G. 247.
"Green v. Bissell (197o) 79 Conn. 547; Williams v. W. U. Tel. Co.
(883) 93 N. Y. 162.
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shares which have been purchased by the company. It has been
asserted that such stock dividends should be irrevocable in like
manner as cash dividends.5 When the stock dividend involves
only an increase of the company's capital, until the formalities
which are required by law are completed, the company may
revoke the dividend.6
The court recognized the well-settled rule in regard to cash
dividends, and relied chiefly on Terry v. Eagle Lock -Co.' and
Dock v. Schlichter Jute Cordage Co.
8
The court in the former case referred to the petitioner's right
as a "mere naked right which he might waive without losing
anything, and might enforce vithout gaining anything." It is
submitted, however, that while it is true that the value of the
property of the corporation is not increased or diminished by the
declaration of the stock dividend, still, its liabilities, actual and
potential, are increased pro tanto in relation to the shareholders.
The actual value of the holdings of the shareholders in the
aggregate remains unchanged, though the jural relations differ.
Before the stock dividend is declared, shareholders have only a
right that the directors shall exercise good faith in declaring or
refraining from declaring a dividend. After a stock dividend
is declared, the shareholders have a right to a determinate
amount of stock certificates, providing statutory formalities are
complied with, while before such a dividend is. declared they are
under a disability to claim any definite amount of either stock
or dividends. When a large amount of stock, representing sur-
'Machen, Modern Law of Corporations, Vol. I, sec. 6oi, citing Dock v.
Schlichter Jute Cordage Co. (1895) 167 Pa. St. 370, which held that a reso-
lution adopted by the directors of a corporation distributing among the
shareholders shares of stock of the company, which had been purchased
by the company out of its earnings, cannot be subsequently rescinded
where it is not shown that such distribution would be injurious to the
business of the company. See also City of Allegheny v. Pittsburgh, etc.,
Ry. (1897) 179 Pa. St 414; Green v. Bissell, supra.
'Machen, op. cit., citing Terry v. Eagle Lock Co. (1879) 47 Conn. 141.
(1879) 47 Conn. 41. This case cannot too strongly be relied upon
to support the decision in the principal case, inasmuch as the plaintiff
was guilty of laches. The court says: "The petitioner has by his silence
acquiesced in the transactions of which he complains, by his conduct and
implied assent he has waived any rights which might once have been
his. . . . Lapse of time creates an equitable estoppel." Story, Eq.
Jur., sec. 1539a.
8 (i895) 167 Pa. St 370.
YALE LAW JOURNAL
plus earnings, is distributed, it is no mere dilution of stock held
by the shareholders. The value of the stock is based on earning
power and general economic conditions. As a practical matter,
a potential claim to an undivided surplus would seem less desira-
ble than a stock dividend representing such a surplus.
The court refers to Dock v. Schlichter Jute Cordage Co.,
which, negatively speaking, is an important persuasive prece-
dent. There it was not shown that the stock dividend was detri-
mental to the corporation, and it was held to be irrevocable. The
court does not pass on the question whether or not the dividend
would have been held revocable if the company had faced a
difficult financial situation such as confronted the corporation
in the principal case during the European war. However, in
a dictum, it does intimate that the dividend might be revoked.9
Where dividends have been illegally declared under a mis-
apprehension of the existence of profits, they may be revoked,
even after payment to the stockholders, on the theory of mutual
mistake.10 Courts hesitate to enforce stockholders' rights where
such a policy would embarrass the corporation."' There is no
inevitable necessity in deciding that a stock dividend is revocable
or irrevocable in a situation analogous to the one presented in
the principal case. It appears that the court took a view in
accord with sound business policy.
G. S. JR.
POWER OF PATENTEES TO IMPOSE RESTRICTIONS BY NOTICE.
Two decisions of widespread application and interest concern-
ing limitations imposed by notice upon purchasers of patented
articles, have very recently been rendered by the Supreme Court
of the United States.
In the case of Straus v. Victor Talking Machine Co.- it was
sought to enjoin the owners of a department store from selling
Victor talking machines below a certain price. A "license
"'It is believed that, when there has been no such appropriation as that
above mentioned, a company by its board of directors, in a proper case
and for cause, may rescind a resolution declaring a dividend, as where
owing to destruction of a plant by fire immediately following such
resolutions."
"Grant v. Ross (1896) ioo Ky. 44.
"Beers v. Bridgeport Spring Co. (1875) 42 Conn. 17.(April 9, 197) U. S. Sup. Ct., Oct. Term, I916, No. 374.
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notice" was attached to each machine which, amongst other
things, declared that the patented machine is licensed for the
term of the patent; that only the right to use the machine "for
demonstrating purposes" is granted to wholesale dealers; that
the dealers may convey the "license" to use the machine only
when a "royalty" of not less than $2oo shall have been paid.
It also provided that the title to the machine shall remain in the
patentee which shall have the right to repossess it upon breach
of any of the conditions of the notice.
The patentee, it is to be observed, had no contract relation
with the dealer and based its right against the dealer on the
"license notice." The language used in the notice seemingly
related to the use of the machine. But it was apparent to the
court that, although the word "sale" was scrupulously avoided,
the elaborate provisions embodied in the notice were in fact only
designed to maintain the price of the talking machine.
There was a reason, however, for employing language that
purported to grant a right to use rather than to indicate the real
character of the transaction-a sale. The Supreme Court had
decided in Bauer v. O'Donnell,
2 that a patentee has no power
to limit by notice the price at which the patented article may be
resold at retail. But as regards the use of patented articles, the
patentee could restrict that by mere notice
2 Hence the importance
of characterizing the system as a grant of a right to use. After
an analysis of the provisions of the notice, the court concluded
that it was in substance, and in fact, a mere price-fixing enter-
prise and hence, falling within the principles of Bauer z.
O'Donnell,4 it would not be enforced.
The other patent case brought before the court the problem
that confronted it in Henry v. A. B. Dick Co.
5 In the Dick case
a patented mimeograph had been sold which bore an inscrip-
tion in the form of a notice that the machine was sold with the
license restriction that it might only be used with stencil, ink
and other supplies made by the owners of the patent. One who
supplied ink for this machine in violation of the notice, of which
2 (1912) 229 U. S. I.
"Henry v. A. B. Dick Co. (ig91) 224 U. S. i. See comment discussing





he had knowledge, was held to be a contributory infringer of the
patent.
In the case now before the court,8 a patent covered a part of
the mechanism used in motion-picture exhibiting machines. A
plate was attached to each machine stating that it was to be used
only with films of the patentee, and upon other terms to be fixedby the patentee. Forty thousand of the plaintiff's machines werein use in this country and the mechanism covered by the patent
in suit was the only one in which motion pictures could be used
successfully. The defendant made two films which were supplied
to the patented machine after a warning that an infringement
would result.
Was this notice limiting the use of the machine to unpatentedfilms, which are no part of the machine, valid and enforcible?
By a process of clear reasoning and analysis of the statutory
powers and privileges bestowed upon patentees, the court decided
that there was no intention to give a patentee a monopoly over
unpatented materials that could be used with the patented article,
nor was such a privilege expressly given. The court realizing
that its conclusions are at variance with those reached in the
Dick case only a few years ago, states in the opinion that the Dick
case must be regarded as overruled.
This result reached by the highest tribunal of the land is
eminently satisfactory to the public at large for the reason thatit limits the monopoly of the patentee to the very mechanism
that is patented. It also permits the use of the patented article
in combination with a wider variety of materials and so enlarges
the beneficial uses that can be made of the patented article.
Is this reversal of the Dick case justified in principle? Whence
arise the extraordinary rights, powers, privileges and immunities
that the patentee has or contends for in addition to what
the owner of an ordinary chattel possesses? Pursuant to
authorization by the Constitution,7 an Act of Congress provides
that every patent shall contain "a grant to the patentee, his heirs
and assigns, for the .term of seventeen years, of the exclusive
right to make, use, and vend the invention or discovery."8 From
this statute the patentee derives his extraordinary rights and
'Motion Picture Patents Co. v. Universal Film Mfg. Co. (April 9,1917) U. S. Sup. Ct, Oct Term, 1916, No. 715.
'Art 8, sec. i.
'U. S. Rev. Sts., sec. 4884.
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powers. A construction of this language cannot reasonably give
greater powers to the patentee in limiting the use by notice than
in restricting the price of sale. If the ruling in the Bauer case
is to be supported that price restrictions are invalid, then use
restrictions should also be held invalid.
It is true that the English courts9 give the patentee the privi-
lege of restricting both use and price of sale by notice, not-
withstanding the fact that the English patent law is worded
almost identically like ours. The reason for thus deciding is
not because of positive language in the statute that necessitates
such holding. It is rather by a process of inference and logic
that the English courts come to such a conclusion. Inasmuch
as the patent law gives the patentee the privilege of withholding
his patent from the world for a period of seventeen years, he
may give the patent to the world encumbered with any conditions
he sees fit to impose.
It is submitted that our Supreme Court, as indicated by the
opinions just rendered in the phonograph and moving picture
cases, is justified in rejecting this method of reasoning and arriv-
ing at a different conclusion. It should be constantly borne in
mind that the primary object of the patent laws was the benefit
of the community at large.10 The private interests of the patentee
are protected and safeguarded for the purpose of stimulating the
efforts of genius which ultimately are to aid the public by
promoting "the progress of science and useful arts."
The very theory of the patent law is that the rewards thus
made possible to the inventor will act as an incentive and stimu-
lus to the creation of new and useful mechanisms. These rewards
can usually only be earned by the marketing of the invented
product. If the intention of Congress was to permit restrictions
by notice, it has not made it plain. When the time arrives in
which it becomes evident that without being privileged to impose
conditions by notice, the rewards to inventors are not ample
enough to induce people to use their best efforts to invent and
discover, then Congress should legislate in plain and unequivocal
language granting these privileges. Under the present statute
and under present circumstances, the public welfare does not
require that a patentee should be permitted to regulate prices,
'Phonograph Co. v. Menk [igi9] A. C. 336.
"
0Pennock v. Dialogue (1829) 2 Pet. (U. S.) i; Kendall v. Winsor
(1859) 21 How. (U. S.) 322; Walker, Patents, sec. 185.
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or to limit the use of the patented article so as to prevent its
use with materials not made or sold by the patentee. The deci-
sions of the Supreme Court of the United States in the phono-
graph and moving picture cases are sound in principle and will
undoubtedly be approved by the public at large.
M. H. L.
CORPORATE RATIFICATION OF THE MISAPPROPRIATION OF ITS FUNDS
The attempt on the part of a corporation to ratify an unauthor-
ized act presents the question whether it is such an act as
could originally have been authorized.1 Accordingly, in con-
sidering the validity of the ratification of an officer's conversion
of funds to his own use, such as was shown to have taken place
in E. Moch Co. v. Security Bank of New York,2 it becomes
important to investigate the power of a corporation to make
a gift of its assets to an individual. The power of a corpora-
tion to perform a legally binding transaction may in a vague
way be said to be confined within the scope of its charter,
express or implied," but this is not entirely accurate.- Ultra
vires corporate acts create new legal relations, but there is a
liability to attack by the state, or by certain interested parties,
such as creditors, if the act in question is beyond the authority
conferred by charter. Even if specifically forbidden by statute
the act is not necessarily inoperative.5 It has been held in a
federal court that a conveyance of land in violation of state
' Clark and Marshall, Private Corporations, p. 714.
(1917) 163 N. Y. S. :277.
"McCormick v. Market Banks (1897) 165 U. S. 538, 549.
"Thus an agent may be made to account to the corporation for secret
profits from an ultra vires transaction. As between the two the act has
not been void. Memphis & A. C. Packet Co. v. Agnew (1g5) i77 S. W.
(Tenn.) 949; New Hampshire Ins. Co. v. Kennedy (1896) 96 Tenn. 715;
Mt. Vernon Bank v. Porter (1892) 52 Mo. App. 244; Mallory v. Mallory
Wheeler Co. (i89i) 61 Conn. 137; Goodhue Farmers' Warehouse Co. v.
Davis (igoo) 81 Minn. 211.
'Model Heating Co. v. Margarity (1911) 81 Ati. (Del.) 394; Helvetia
Swiss Fire Ins. Co. v. Edward P. Allis Co. (1898) II Col. App. 264; Hal-
lam v. Ashford (19o2) 70 S. W. (Ky.) 197; Galletly v. Strickland (i9o6)
74 S. C. 34; Horrell v. California 0. & W. Homebuilder's Ass'n. (igo5)
40 Wash. 531; Toledo Tile & Lumber Co. v. Thomas (189o) 33 W. Va.
566; Garrett Ford Co. v. Vermont Mfg. Co. (1897) 20 R . 187.
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law gave a perfectly good title to the grantee.6 It is only where
the corporation's action is so entirely beyond the purpose of its
organization or so contrary to business integrity as to be utterly
contrary to public policy, that it will be held to be truly void
ab initio. The most that can be said for those courts that pro-
claim the invalidity of an ultra vires act F is that they apply their
rule more nearly universally than do others.
Upon the facts of the principal case there is, to a certain
degree, no question. All courts are rightly reticent in admitting
the power to make gifts of corporate funds." If any act, not
specifically authorized, should be considered ultra vires, it is
this. If the performance of any ultra vires act should, on
grounds of public policy alone, be held completely ineffectual,
it is an act intended to disperse corporate assets without sub-
stantial returns. Certainly where there is any stockholder who
might be adversely affected thereby, and who has not given
his consent, justice requires that the transaction be declared void.
Hence it is well decided that the gift of corporate funds to a
private individual for his own use cannot be made by the board
of directors, nor by any officers intrusted with the conduct of
ordinary business. 9 It cannot even be validated by the consent
of the stockholders.10 But where every one of the stockholders
has consented either in advance or by subsequent ratification, the
specific interest injured has been reduced to that of the creditors.
Of course, objections based upon general public policy must also
be considered.
'Fritts v. Palmer (1889) 132 U. S. 282.
'Germania Safety Vault & Trust Co. et al. v. Boynton (1896) ig C. C. A.
xI8; Central Transportation Co. v. Pullman Palace Car Co. (i89o) 139
U. S. 59; Humboldt Mining Co. v. American Manufacturing Mining and
Milling Co. (1894) 62 Fed. 356; Iron Co. v. Riche (1875) 7 H. L. Cas. 653;
Metropolitan Stock Exchange v. Lyndonville National Bank (904) 76 Vt.
303; Marble Co. v. Harvey (1892) 92 Tenn. 112; Downing v. Mt. Wash-
ington Road Co. (i86o) 40 N. H. 230.
"Taunton v. Royal Ins. Co. (1864) 2 H. & M. 135; Davis v. Old Colony
R. R. Co. (i88i) 131 Mass. 271, in which a voluntary payment of an
ex-officer for pastservices was held ultra vires.
'Kenyon ]Realty Co. v. National Deposit Bank (igio) 13o S. W. (Ky.)
965; Watkins Salt Co. v. Mulkey (915) 225 Fed. 739.
"Hyams v. Old Dominion Co. (1915) 93 AUt. (Me.) 747; In the Pros-
pect Worsted Mills (I9o4) 126 Fed. oii ; McConnell v. Combination Min-
ing & Mill Co. (Io4) 30 Mont. 239; Von Arwin v. American Tube Works
(iqo5) 188 Mass. 515; Pollitz v. Wabash R. R. (913) 207 N. Y. 113.
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Shall it then be said that a valid transfer has been made save
for the liability to defeasance by creditors; or should it be held,
as in the principal case, that there was no power whatever to
create valid rights and that the corporation may recover mis-
appropriated funds in spite of a ratification?
The practical importance of this problem is illustrated in the
principal case. Here the misappropriation had been ratified by
agreement of the holders of all the stocks, except two employees
to whom the shares had been issued to enable them to fill the
positions of directors. Inasmuch as their interest was purely
nominal, their absence from the agreement may be disregarded,
as is intimated in the dissenting opinion. It would be too tech-
nical a peg upon which to hang a decision which, if to be sus-
tained at all, might better be based on broader grounds. The
cases referred to in the majority opinion to support the proposi-
tion that the want of the approval of even one stockholder might
prevent ratification, were cases of individuals who were bonafide stockholders with a substantial interest.11 Nor should the
fact that the plaintiff corporation is legally distinct from the
stockholders who ratified, impair per se the effectiveness of the
defense. This was not an attempted estoppel of the one by
the acts of the other, even if such were possible, as it might be,
on the basis of merger of identity, but merely a combination
of all the shareholders to take valid corporate action.
The true foundation for the decision in the principal case must
be that there is no power, even in all the stockholders acting
together, to make such a transfer binding.12 This, and this alone,
would justify recovery by the corporation. Inasmuch as the suit
was not brought by creditors, or even for their benefit, it cannot
be said that their interests would have been unfavorably adjudi-
cated by denying recovery to the present plaintiff. The minority
opinion intimated that the transaction in question would be void-
able at the suit of creditors, but holds that as against others, all
the stockholders have power to make it valid and binding.
It is worthy of note that in many cases'the argument set forth
for the apparent holding that the gift, or ratified misappropria-
tion, is completely void, is that the corporate assets are to be
'Continental Securities Co. v. Belmont (1912) 2o6 N. Y. 7; Pollitz v.
Wabash R. R., supra.
" Wheeler v. Home Savings Bank (igoo) 188 IM. 34; Germania Safety
Vault & Trust Co. v. Boynton, supra.
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regarded as a trust fund for the corporation's creditors.13 This
reasoning would imply that, but for the trust fund theory, a dif-
ferent conclusion would have been reached. In fact a few
decisions or dicta are to the effect that such conversion of the
corporate assets might be ratified by all the stockholders, so as
to become altogether valid.14 Without going so far as to agree
with such a rule, it may be said that as between declaring
the transfer in the principal case void, or merely voidable at
the instance of creditors, substantial justice would be done to the
creditors in either case. The ultimate ratio decidendi is the
public policy of such an example. C. B.
THE OREGON TEN HOUR LAW SUSTAINED.
The recent decision1 of the Supreme Court of the United
States affirming the constitutionality of the Oregon statute regu-
lating hours of labor is deserving of comment as indicating
a changed attitude of the court with regard to legislation of
this character. The decision is by a divided court, Mr. Chief
Justice White, Mr. Justice Van Devanter and Mr. Justice
McReynolds dissenting without opinion, and Mr. Justice Brandeis
taking no part in the consideration of the case.
The statute provided as follows:
"No person shall be employed in any mill, factory or
manufacturing establishment in this State more than ten
hours in any one day, except watchmen and employees
when engaged in making necessary repairs, or in cases of
emergency, when life or property is in imminent danger;
provided, however, employees may work overtime not to
exceed three hours in any one day, conditional that pay-
ment be made for such overtime at the rate of time and
one-half of the regular wage."
"
3National Trust Co. v. Miller (88o) 33 N. J. Eq. 155; Hurd v. N. Y.
& C. Steam Laundry Co. (i9O1) 167 N. Y. 89; Ward v. City Trust Co.
(igo8) 192 N. Y. 61; see also Snow v. Long (1861) 2 Allen (Mass.) 18,
where a gift of goods declared by statute void as to creditors was held
valid and ratifiable, being voidable only by the creditors.
1 Martin v. N. F. P. Mfg. Co. (189o) 122 N. Y. 165; see McConnell v.
Combination Mining & Mill Co., supra; In the Prospect Worsted Mills,
supra; Arnold v. Searing (19o7) 67 Atl. (N. J.) 831.
'Franklin 0. Bunting v. State of Oregon (April 9, 19i6) U. S. Sup.
Ct., Oct Term, 1916, No. 38.
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The contention was made that the provision for overtime at
the rate of time and one-half marked this as a wage law and not
an hours of service law. The court thus replies to this argument:
"There is a certain verbal plausibility in the conten-
tion that it was intended to permit 13 hours' work if there
be 15Y2 hours' pay, but the plausibility disappears upon
reflection. The provision for overtime is permissive, in
the same sense that any penalty may be said to be per-
missive. Its purpose is to deter by its burden and its
adequacy for this was a matter of legislative judgment
under the particular circumstances. It may not achieve
its end, but its insufficiency cannot change its character
from penalty to permission."
To the writer this argument seems inadequate. The clause
for overtime is technically a proviso, which exempts from the
operation of the statute the subject-matter of the proviso upon
performance of the condition. To call it a penalty is a doubtful
use of the term. Strictly speaking a penalty is a punishment
inflicted by law for its violation. This clause does not partake
strictly of the nature of a penal clause. It provides a condition
upon compliance with which no law is violated. If it is a penalty
it would seem to be one hitherto unknown to the law, self-
imposed by the employer, without having been convicted by due
process of breaking the law, and paid, not to the state, but to
one who is a party to the illegal act. It is to be regretted that
the court did not pass upon the question of whether a wage law
may not be imposed under the police power, though it was not
necessary to a decision of the case, as the court had held it to
be an hours of service law.
But even as an hours of service law -the decision marks a
departure from the previous attitude of the court. In Lochner
v. New York,2 in holding unconstitutional a law providing that
no employees should be required or permitted to work in
bakeries more than sixty hours a week, or ten hours a day, the
court said:
"Statutes of the nature of that under review, limiting
the hours in which grown and intelligent men may labor
to earn their living, are mere meddlesome interferences
with the rights of the individual, and they are not saved
from condemnation by the claim that they are passed in
2 (19os) 198 U. S. 45.
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the exercise of the police power and upon the subject
of the health of the individual whose rights are inter-
fered with, unless there be some fair ground, reasonable
in itself, to say that there is material danger to the public
health or to the health of the employees, if the hours are
not curtailed."
But there were four dissents in that case, Justices Harlan,
White, Day, and Holmes dissenting. The Oregon law, covering
"any mill, factory or manufacturing establishment," clearly falls
without the class of laws which would have been held constitu-
tional by the court as it was then constituted. It is interesting
to note that- the changes wrought by time in the personnel of
the court have brought about a change in their attitude, so that
now the view of the minority in Lochner v. New York has
become that of the court. To attempt to reconcile or distinguish
the two cases is to lose sight of the fact that just as the common
law was "judge-made," so our constitution and its restrictions
are "judge-applied." The transition from the older view was
not sudden, but was a gradual one. The court evidenced its
departure from the Lochner case by its decision in Miller v.
Wilson,3 in which the opinion was delivered by. Mr. Justice
Hughes. There a California statute of 1911 forbade the employ-
ment of women in certain specified establishments for more than
eight hours in one day, forty-eight hours in one week. It was
held that, as applied to women employed in hotels, the law did
not violate the Federal Constitution, by infringing freedom to
contract.
The decision in the principal case is quite in accord with
the present tendency toward governmental supervision over
the affairs of the individual and the corporation through a broad
construction of the police power and the commerce clause. The
expressed fear of the court in Lochner v. New York
9
' (1915) 236 U. S. 373. The court farther says: "As the liberty of
compact guaranteed by the Constitution is freedom from arbitrary
restraint,-not immunity from reasonable regulation to safeguard the
public interest,--the question is whether the restrictions of the statute
have reasonable relation to a proper purpose." The Court then goes on
to cite some of its recent decisions upholding similar statutes limiting the
hours of labor of women, e. g., Muller v. Oregon (1907) 208 U. S. 412;
Riley v. Mass. (1913) 2 2 U. S. 671; Hawley v. Walker (1913) 232 U. S.
718. See also the older case of Holden v. Hardy (1898) 169 U. S. 366.
' (1905) 198 U. S. 45, 62.
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that the state would assume "the position of a supervisor, or
pater familias, over every act of the individual" appears not to
have been unfounded.
It remains to be seen whether the words of Mr. Justice Peckham
have, as an apprehension, a raison d'etre.
W. W. G.
